Jörg Rothe
80 publications
10 venues
H Index 19
Affiliation
University of D sseldorf, GermanyLinks
| Name | Venue | Year | citations |
|---|---|---|---|
NP
|
AAMAS | 2024 | 0 |
| The complexity of verifying popularity and strict popularity in altruistic hedonic games.
|
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems | 2024 | 0 |
| Fair and efficient allocation with few agent types, few item types, or small value levels.
|
Artificial Intelligence | 2023 | 0 |
| Complexity Results and Exact Algorithms for Fair Division of Indivisible Items: A Survey.
|
IJCAI | 2023 | 0 |
| Complexity of Control by Adding or Deleting Edges in Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games.
|
ECAI | 2023 | 0 |
| Popularity and Strict Popularity in Altruistic Hedonic Games and Minimum-Based Altruistic Hedonic Games.
|
AAMAS | 2022 | 1 |
| Voting for Centrality.
|
AAMAS | 2022 | 0 |
| Altruistic Hedonic Games.
|
JAIR | 2022 | 0 |
| Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games.
|
ADT | 2021 | 0 |
| Towards completing the puzzle: complexity of control by replacing, adding, and deleting candidates or voters.
|
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems | 2021 | 0 |
| Control complexity in Borda elections: Solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control.
|
Artificial Intelligence | 2021 | 6 |
| Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor as Thyself When Thou Playest: Altruism in Game Theory.
|
AAAI | 2021 | 3 |
| Acceptance in incomplete argumentation frameworks.
|
Artificial Intelligence | 2021 | 15 |
| Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds.
|
JAIR | 2020 | 10 |
| Approximate Pareto Set for Fair and Efficient Allocation: Few Agent Types or Few Resource Types.
|
IJCAI | 2020 | 7 |
| Towards Reality: Smoothed Analysis in Computational Social Choice.
|
AAMAS | 2020 | 11 |
| Deciding Acceptance in Incomplete Argumentation Frameworks.
|
AAAI | 2020 | 12 |
| The Last Voting Rule Is Home: Complexity of Control by Partition of Candidates or Voters in Maximin Elections.
|
ECAI | 2020 | 2 |
| Altruism in Coalition Formation Games.
|
IJCAI | 2020 | 6 |
| Complexity of Possible and Necessary Existence Problems in Abstract Argumentation.
|
ECAI | 2020 | 2 |
| The Complexity of Cloning Candidates in Multiwinner Elections.
|
AAMAS | 2020 | 0 |
| Refugee Allocation in the Setting of Hedonic Games.
|
ADT | 2019 | 0 |
| Borda Count in Collective Decision Making: A Summary of Recent Results.
|
AAAI | 2019 | 8 |
| Stability in FEN-Hedonic Games for Single-Player Deviations.
|
AAMAS | 2019 | 6 |
| Optimizing Social Welfare in Social Networks.
|
ADT | 2019 | 5 |
| The Complexity of Online Bribery in Sequential Elections (Extended Abstract).
|
TARK | 2019 | 0 |
| Complexity of Shift Bribery in Iterative Elections.
|
AAMAS | 2018 | 24 |
| Bounds on the Cost of Stabilizing a Cooperative Game.
|
JAIR | 2018 | 6 |
| Approximation and complexity of the optimization and existence problems for maximin share, proportional share, and minimax share allocation of indivisible goods.
|
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems | 2018 | 0 |
| Sequential Allocation Rules are Separable: Refuting a Conjecture on Scoring-Based Allocation of Indivisible Goods.
|
AAMAS | 2018 | 2 |
| Verification in incomplete argumentation frameworks.
|
Artificial Intelligence | 2018 | 37 |
| Complexity of Verification in Incomplete Argumentation Frameworks.
|
AAAI | 2018 | 8 |
| Solving Seven Open Problems of Offline and Online Control in Borda Elections.
|
AAAI | 2017 | 10 |
| Complexity of Control by Partition of Voters and of Voter Groups in Veto and Other Scoring Protocols.
|
AAMAS | 2017 | 7 |
| Approximate Solutions To Max-Min Fair and Proportionally Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods.
|
AAMAS | 2017 | 19 |
| The complexity of online voter control in sequential elections.
|
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems | 2017 | 0 |
| Positional scoring-based allocation of indivisible goods.
|
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems | 2017 | 0 |
| Structural Control in Weighted Voting Games: (Extended Abstract).
|
AAMAS | 2016 | 1 |
| Local Fairness in Hedonic Games via Individual Threshold Coalitions.
|
AAMAS | 2016 | 8 |
| Altruistic Hedonic Games.
|
AAMAS | 2016 | 24 |
| Complexity of Control by Partitioning Veto and Maximin Elections and of Control by Adding Candidates to Plurality Elections.
|
ECAI | 2016 | 0 |
| Fairness and Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism in Resource Allocation.
|
ADT | 2015 | 16 |
| Complexity of Bribery and Control for Uniform Premise-Based Quota Rules Under Various Preference Types.
|
ADT | 2015 | 5 |
| Representing and Solving Hedonic Games with Ordinal Preferences and Thresholds.
|
AAMAS | 2015 | 32 |
| Strategy-Proofness of Scoring Allocation Correspondences for Indivisible Goods.
|
IJCAI | 2015 | 18 |
| Verification in Attack-Incomplete Argumentation Frameworks.
|
ADT | 2015 | 16 |
| Verification in Argument-Incomplete Argumentation Frameworks.
|
ADT | 2015 | 16 |
| Complexity of manipulation, bribery, and campaign management in Bucklin and fallback voting.
|
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems | 2015 | 0 |
| Complexity of manipulation, bribery, and campaign management in bucklin and fallback voting.
|
AAMAS | 2014 | 1 |
| Scoring Rules for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods.
|
ECAI | 2014 | 16 |
| Bribery in multiple-adversary path-disruption games is hard for the second level of the polynomial hierarchy.
|
AAMAS | 2014 | 5 |
| False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time.
|
JAIR | 2014 | 0 |
| Computational complexity and approximability of social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation.
|
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems | 2014 | 0 |
| Envy-ratio and average-nash social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation.
|
AAMAS | 2013 | 5 |
| Computational Aspects of Manipulation and Control in Judgment Aggregation.
|
ADT | 2013 | 28 |
| How to Decrease the Degree of Envy in Allocations of Indivisible Goods.
|
ADT | 2013 | 11 |
| The Complexity of Online Manipulation of Sequential Elections.
|
TARK | 2013 | 0 |
| Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots.
|
AAMAS | 2012 | 94 |
| The Possible Winner Problem with Uncertain Weights.
|
ECAI | 2012 | 24 |
| Online Voter Control in Sequential Elections.
|
ECAI | 2012 | 19 |
| Controlling Candidate-Sequential Elections.
|
ECAI | 2012 | 13 |
| Probabilistic Path-Disruption Games.
|
ECAI | 2012 | 4 |
| Complexity and approximability of social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation.
|
AAMAS | 2012 | 0 |
| Computational complexity of two variants of the possible winner problem.
|
AAMAS | 2011 | 42 |
| How Hard Is it to Bribe the Judges? A Study of the Complexity of Bribery in Judgment Aggregation.
|
ADT | 2011 | 33 |
| How to Calibrate the Scores of Biased Reviewers by Quadratic Programming.
|
AAAI | 2011 | 44 |
| The complexity of voter partition in Bucklin and fallback voting: solving three open problems.
|
AAMAS | 2011 | 33 |
| Bribery in Path-Disruption Games.
|
ADT | 2011 | 10 |
| Complexity of social welfare optimization in multiagent resource allocation.
|
AAMAS | 2010 | 24 |
| Taking the Final Step to a Full Dichotomy of the Possible Winner Problem in Pure Scoring Rules.
|
ECAI | 2010 | 68 |
| Complexity of Merging and Splitting for the Probabilistic Banzhaf Power Index in Weighted Voting Games.
|
ECAI | 2010 | 7 |
| Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control.
|
JAIR | 2009 | 222 |
| The shield that never was: societies with single-peaked preferences are more open to manipulation and control.
|
TARK | 2009 | 141 |
| The Complexity of Probabilistic Lobbying.
|
ADT | 2009 | 56 |
| The cost of stability in weighted voting games.
|
AAMAS | 2009 | 30 |
| Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting Protocols.
|
WINE | 2009 | 7 |
| Llull and Copeland Voting Broadly Resist Bribery and Control.
|
AAAI | 2007 | 53 |
| Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control.
|
IJCAI | 2007 | 0 |
| Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative.
|
Artificial Intelligence | 2007 | 0 |
| Anyone but Him: The Complexity of Precluding an Alternative.
|
AAAI | 2005 | 232 |